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INTRODUCTION 
Kelly and Bryan are in love.  About two years ago, after dating for 
some time, they decided to move out of their respective parents’ 
homes and in together.  Since Kelly and Bryan are both employed 
and earn about the same amount of money, they determined that 
they could afford it.  So, they co-signed a lease to an apartment, 
bought some furniture, and set up their utilities.  They even opened a 
joint checking account to which they both contribute and from which 
they buy food, pay the monthly bills, and cover other daily incidental 
expenses.  Now, they are thinking about getting married.  However, 
what Kelly and Bryan may not realize is that as soon as they take mar-
riage vows, their financial obligations may change.  For, as soon as 
they legally wed, they could be subject to higher taxes on their in-
comes and could face termination of some government benefits that 
they may receive.1 
But what will have changed?  Their love for one another will not 
have changed; their incomes will not have changed; their household 
expenses will not have changed.  In a sense, their “marriage is reduc-
ible to a piece of paper—the marriage license.”2  Yet that piece of pa-
per may somehow give the government the power to charge Kelly and 
Bryan more and pay them less.3 
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 1 See infra Part III. 
 2 Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 239, 239 (2001). 
 3 In fact, economist Justin Wolfers has estimated that “[t]he average tax cost of marriage 
for a dual-income couple is $1,500 annually.”  Jenny Anderson, Economists in Love:  Betsey 
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To be sure, the financial penalties Kelly and Bryan may face are 
not imposed on every married couple.  In fact, many couples may re-
alize financial benefits by marrying due to the consolidation of 
household expenses and the sharing of other resources.4  However, 
in the United States, there remain some classes of couples, like Kelly 
and Bryan, that will be financially disadvantaged purely by virtue of 
taking marriage vows.  In the tax context, this class can be defined as 
those couples comprised of two working partners who generate simi-
lar incomes.  In the government benefit context,5 the class can be de-
fined as those couples comprised of two partners who have a fairly 
low combined income. 
Laws often distinguish between married and unmarried persons 
for various purposes.  Unsurprisingly, these distinctions are often 
challenged in the court system as unconstitutional violations of equal 
protection and due process under the claim that one’s marital status 
should not have a bearing on his or her rights, benefits, or obliga-
tions.  However, while most cases address challenges to laws that dis-
advantage unmarried persons (because traditionally marital status 
distinctions have worked to discriminate against the unmarried), 
some address challenges to laws that burden married persons while 
distinctly advantaging unmarried persons. 
This Comment focuses on the latter class of cases partly because 
they receive considerably less attention.6  It also concentrates on 
those cases because in upholding such burdens, courts use reasoning 
 
Stevenson and Justin Wolfers, IT’S NOT YOU, IT’S THE DISHES (Mar. 10, 2011), 
http://www.itsthedishes.com/2343/2011/03/economists-in-love-betsey-stevenson-and-
justin-wolfers/. 
 4 This, of course, is aside from the legal benefits that accompany a marital relationship.  See 
Legal and Economic Benefits of Marriage, RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE,  http://www.
religioustolerance.org/mar_bene.htm (last updated July 4, 2011) (providing examples of 
legal and economic benefits conferred upon married couples in the United States). 
 5 It must be noted that government benefit programs can determine how benefits will be 
allocated very differently.  Thus, defining a disadvantaged class of couples in the social 
security disability context may be very different from defining a disadvantaged class in the 
farmworkers’ benefits context.  Consequently, this definition may not be applicable or 
fully accurate with respect to all couples disadvantaged under all government benefit 
programs. 
 6 Cf. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Marital Status Discrimination:  A Proposal for Title VII Protection, 
46 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (2000) (arguing in favor of an amendment to Title VII to prohibit 
marital status discrimination); John C. Beattie, Note, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimina-
tion:  A Proposal for the Protection of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS L. J. 1415 (1991) (dis-
cussing the role of state prohibitions against marital discrimination in protecting the 
rights of unmarried couples); Matthew J. Smith, Comment, The Wages of Living in Sin:  
Discrimination in Housing Against Unmarried Couples, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1055 (1992) 
(suggesting that Congress should prohibit housing discrimination against unmarried 
couples). 
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that is unclear, irrational, and outdated.  Finally, it examines these 
cases because marriage today is in a state of instability,7 and, as a poli-
cy matter, if the government and the courts wish to promote mar-
riage, as they have traditionally done, it is curious that they unques-
tioningly support these laws. 
Specifically, this Comment will explore two areas in which courts 
have been consistently unwilling to find equal protection and due 
process violations:  tax law and the distribution of economic govern-
ment benefits.  After providing a brief introduction to the Equal Pro-
tection and Due Process Clauses, it will examine courts’ rationales 
and constitutional analyses in these cases, which, at least at first 
glance, often appear inconsistent, shaky, and ad hoc.  It will then 
compare and contrast these rationales and analyses with a subject ar-
ea in which courts have struck down laws that discriminate based on 
marital status to the detriment of married persons.  Finally, this 
Comment will offer four possible explanations for these disparate re-
sults and evaluate their validity.  The possible explanations this 
Comment will examine include:  (1) the natures of taxation and gov-
ernment benefit distribution; (2) the difficulty of applying the lead-
ing right-to-marry precedents; (3) courts’ belief in and deference to 
the assumption that marriage does and should privatize dependency; 
and (4) the existence of many other benefits that advantage married 
couples compared to singles.  Ultimately, this Comment will conclude 
that each of these possible explanations is flawed in some way and will 
offer a few potential alternative approaches courts could adopt. 
I.  EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS OVERVIEW 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o 
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”8  At the outset, it is important to recog-
nize that the two clauses are distinct and thus may apply in different 
circumstances and employ different analyses. 
 
 7 See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 2, at 245, 246 (“Marriage does not have the same relevance 
as a societal institution as it did even fifty years ago . . . . [T]he traditional marital family 
has become a statistical minority of family units in our society.”); Elizabeth S. Scott, Mar-
riage, Cohabitation, and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 232 
(2004) (“The number of couples who live together in informal unions has increased 
steadily over the past half-century, and mainstream society today is morally neutral toward 
this form of intimate association.”). 
 8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Most simply, substantive due process,9 as described by Professor 
Erwin Chemerinsky, “asks the question of whether the government’s 
deprivation of a person’s life, liberty or property is justified by a suffi-
cient purpose.”10  In other words, substantive due process asks:  Does 
the government have a good enough reason to interfere with an indi-
vidual’s interests?11 
While substantive due process first arose in the context of eco-
nomic liberties,12 the Court has used and continues “to use substan-
tive due process to safeguard rights that are not otherwise enumerat-
ed in the [C]onstitution.”13  In identifying which rights deserve 
protection, the Court has largely looked to tradition and the intent of 
the Framers.14  When the Court has recognized a right as being tradi-
 
 9 Substantive due process can be contrasted with, and is distinct from, procedural due pro-
cess, with which I am not concerned in this Comment. 
 10 Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 (1999); see also 
Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of Power:  Has the Court Taken 
the Substance Out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313, 321 (1991) 
(“[S]ubstantive due process imposes limits on the legislative branch of government by 
prohibiting the legislature from passing arbitrary, capricious statutes which unduly inter-
fere with individual rights.”). 
 11 See Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 1501 (“Substantive due process looks to whether there 
is a sufficient substantive justification, a good enough reason for such a deprivation [of 
life, liberty, or property.]”); Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, The Right to Join a Family:  Traditional Mar-
riage and the Alternatives, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1256 (1980) (“Substantive due process 
methodology involves a balancing of the governmental and individual interests implicat-
ed.”). 
 12 See Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 56–57 (1905) (holding that the right to purchase and sell 
labor is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 
1502 (“Substantive due process was used . . . in the first third of this century to aggressive-
ly protect economic liberties from government interference.  Lochner v. New York is the 
quintessential case from that era.”).  In that case, the Court found that an individual’s 
ability to make contracts is a fundamental right and that deprivations of this right must be 
analyzed using strict scrutiny.  See id. at 1502–03 (“The Supreme Court held, to use mod-
ern language, that freedom of contract was a fundamental right under the liberty of the 
due process clause and used strict scrutiny to evaluate this law.”).  However, many schol-
ars trace the concept back much further.  See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 10, at 318 (“The 
concept of substantive due process has strong historical roots dating back to the Magna 
Carta and Lockean tradition which first found its way into American jurisprudence in the 
1870s.”). 
 13 Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 1510. 
 14 See id. at 1513 (“Justice Scalia [in Michael H. v. Gerald D.] stated that when the Court con-
siders whether to create rights under substantive due process, such rights should be estab-
lished only if there is a tradition of protecting them . . . .”); id. at 1515 (“In Poe [v. 
Ullman], Harlan said that . . . courts can protect under such [substantive due process] 
rights so long as there is a tradition of such protection.”); id. at 1517 (“Justice White [in 
Bowers v. Hardwick] states rights should be protected under substantive due process only if 
they are enumerated in the text, clearly intended by the framers, or there is a tradition of 
protecting such rights.”); id. at 1520 (“In Washington v. Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
said courts should protect rights under the liberty of the due process clause only if they 
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tionally protected, it often deems that right to be “fundamental.”15  
When such fundamental rights are implicated, the government must 
show that its law can survive strict scrutiny, i.e. that it is narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling state interest. 
However, not all rights are deemed fundamental and thus not all 
laws are subject to strict scrutiny under substantive due process.  For 
example, in Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health and Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, the Court found that the plaintiffs only had “pro-
tected liberty interest[s],” and therefore “abandoned strict scrutiny in 
favor of a less protective balancing approach.”16  Additionally, in areas 
such as economic legislation, while “federal courts still have a legiti-
mate role to play in making sure that individual interests have not 
been sacrificed in an arbitrary, capricious fashion,” review has been 
limited to a determination of whether the law is “rationally related to 
a legitimate state interest.”17  Thus, when determining whether the 
government has a sufficient purpose in depriving a person of life, lib-
erty, or property, a court’s analysis will depend upon the nature of 
the interest involved, which in turn necessitates strict scrutiny, ration-
al basis scrutiny, or an intermediate balancing approach. 
 
are enumerated in the text, intended by the framers or there is a clear tradition of safe-
guarding such a right.”).  However, other scholars observe that the Court has other ways 
of identifying such rights.  See, e.g., Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Pro-
cess, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63 (2006) (arguing that in addition to tradition, the Court has used 
theories of reasoned judgment and evolving national values to identify rights that may be 
protected by the Due Process Clause). 
 15 Fundamental rights recognized under the Due Process Clause include the right to privacy 
and the right of a parent to control the education of his or her child.  For the right to 
privacy, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy, 
whether founded under the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty or the 
Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights of the people, is broad enough to include a 
woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 
(1972) (describing how “[i]f the right of privacy means anything it is the right of the indi-
vidual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child”); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that a statute forbidding the use of con-
traceptives violates a constitutional right to marital privacy).  For parental rights, see 
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 514 (1925) (striking down an act that would effec-
tively deny parents the right to have their children educated at private parochial schools); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (describing how parents have the power to 
control the education of their own children and noting that there are “certain fundamen-
tal rights which must be respected”). 
 16 Conkle, supra note 14, at 74–75.  This approach “triggered serious judicial review but not 
the strong presumptive invalidity of strict scrutiny.”  Id. at 74. 
 17 Levinson, supra note 10, at 320–21.  See also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 
488 (1955) (“It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be 
thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”). 
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Whereas substantive due process questions whether the govern-
ment has a good enough reason to deprive an individual of life, liber-
ty, or property, and thus compares and weighs both the government’s 
and individual’s interests, equal protection analysis focuses on classi-
fications.  It essentially asks whether a law treats groups of similarly 
situated people differently.18 
In response to early inconsistency in the application of the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Court essentially created a “system of multi-
tiered analysis and classification.”19  Through cases such as United 
States v. Carolene Products Co.,20 Skinner v. Oklahoma,21 Korematsu v. Unit-
ed States,22 Griffin v. Illinois,23 Craig v. Boren,24 and United States Railroad 
Retirement Board v. Fritz25 the Court shaped what are known today as 
the three levels of scrutiny:  rational basis, intermediate, and strict.26  
As with substantive due process, the amount of scrutiny given to the 
particular state action at issue depends on “the rights or persons af-
fected.”27  A government action that distinguishes on the basis of a 
suspect classification (such as race) “call[s] for the most exacting ju-
dicial examination.”28  To survive an equal protection challenge it 
 
 18 However, as part of a Civil War Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause was initially on-
ly meant to protect “the fundamental rights of the newly freed slaves from hostile white-
controlled government.”  John Marquez Lundin, Making Equal Protection Analysis Make 
Sense, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1191, 1197 (1999).  See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 
(1967) (“The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate 
all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States.”); Lundin, supra, 
at 1202 (noting that the scope of fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 
has expanded to include political rights, like voting and jury service, as well as economic 
rights).  Nevertheless, since its ratification, the Equal Protection Clause has been em-
ployed by and applied to countless other subject areas and people that have little or noth-
ing to do with the rights of freed slaves, race relations, or even fundamental rights. 
 19 Lundin, supra note 18, at 1211. 
 20 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938) (discussing rational basis). 
 21 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (applying strict scrutiny to the classification in a state steriliza-
tion statute). 
 22 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (noting that racial classifications are immediately suspect and 
that “courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny”). 
 23 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (holding that the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Claus-
es protect prisoners from invidious discrimination at all stages of criminal proceedings). 
 24 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (reaffirming that statutory classifications based on sex are sub-
ject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause). 
 25 449 U.S. 166, 174–79 (1980) (finding that the rational-basis standard is appropriate where 
social and economic legislation is challenged on equal protection grounds). 
 26 Obviously, these levels closely, if not identically, mirror the types of analyses the Court 
uses in substantive due process cases.  These similarities and their implications will be dis-
cussed in further detail. See infra Part IV. 
 27 Lundin, supra note 18, at 1230.  See also, Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 11, at 1256 (“Tra-
ditional equal protection analysis . . . requires the application of one of several discrete 
tests to a statute, depending on the nature of the classification.”). 
 28 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978). 
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must be “narrowly tailored to further a compelling government in-
terest.”29  If the government action categorizes on the basis of a “qua-
si-suspect” classification, such as gender or the marital status of a 
child’s parents, then it will be subject to intermediate scrutiny.30  To 
survive an equal protection challenge it must be “substantially related 
to an important governmental objective.”31  All other government ac-
tions are subject to rational basis review.  They must be upheld unless 
it is inconceivable that they could rationally relate to a legitimate 
government interest.32 
It is likely apparent that substantive due process and equal protec-
tion analyses can look very similar.  Both use comparable or identical 
language (such as strict scrutiny, rational relation, fundamental 
rights, etc.) to describe the analyses being applied in particular cases.  
Both also look to and compare the interests of the government and 
the party involved. Given these similarities, it is unsurprising that 
challenges to government actions are often brought under both 
Clauses, that courts can be unclear about which Clause they are ap-
plying, and that discussions of both Clauses frequently overlap. As 
Part II will show, one area in which these things occur is marriage ju-
risprudence. 
II.  MARRIAGE AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Initially, cases that addressed marriage focused on the institution’s 
prominent role in society.33  However, “[m]ajor decisions of the 
1960[s] [and 1970s] reflected a growing concern with the protection 
of marriage from state intrusion.”34  Although only one dealt with dis-
crimination based on marital status, three cases in particular shaped 
the Court’s current approach to marriage.  The cases are Loving v. 
Virginia,35 Eisenstadt v. Baird,36 and Zablocki v. Redhail.37 
Loving presented an equal protection challenge to Virginia’s mis-
cegenation laws.38  While the Court technically subjected the laws to 
 
 29 Lundin, supra note 18, at 1230. 
 30 See id., at 1230–31. 
 31 Id. at 1231. 
 32 Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179 (“Where, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress’[s] ac-
tion, our inquiry is at an end.”). 
 33 Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 11, at 1248 (noting that “most [early] cases involving mar-
riage turned on the importance of marriage to society”). 
 34 Id. at 1249. 
 35 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 36 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 37 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 38 Loving, 388 U.S. at 2. 
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strict scrutiny because they contained racial classifications,39 which are 
inherently suspect, it also went one step further, holding that 
“[t]here is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of 
invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification.”40  
This language suggests that even if the standard of review was a ra-
tional basis one, the statutes still could not be upheld. 
While most of the Court’s equal protection analysis in Loving does 
not seem to contribute much to a discussion of the Clause’s applica-
tion to marital status-based distinctions, the case is still important in 
this context for at least two reasons.  First, Loving applied an equal 
protection analysis in the context of marital discrimination.  Second, 
the Court added a few critical sentences to the end of its opinion in 
determining that the statutes also violated the Due Process Clause.41  
The Court wrote that 
[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital per-
sonal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.  
Marriage is one of ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very ex-
istence and survival . . . .  The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the 
freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discrimi-
nations.  Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a 
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be in-
fringed by the State.42 
This language, while continuing to emphasize the invidiousness of 
racial classifications, would also become very important for future 
cases addressing marital-based distinctions because, by using terms 
such as “fundamental” and “basic civil rights” to describe marriage, it 
opened the door for arguments that government infringements on 
marriage should be required to survive strict scrutiny.43  For these rea-
sons, even though it did not explicitly address marital status, Loving 
remains a critical source of support for those who challenge various 
regulations affecting marriage. 
Unlike Loving, Baird, which was heavily influenced by Griswold v. 
Connecticut,44 directly addressed an equal protection challenge to dis-
 
 39 Id. at 9, 11. 
 40 Id. at 11. 
 41 Notably, while these sentences appear in the Court’s discussion of the Due Process 
Clause, they are often cited in equal protection analyses as well.  See id. at 12. 
 42 Id. (emphasis added). 
 43 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (describing marriage as a basic civil right and 
fundamental freedom protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against invidious racial 
discrimination). 
 44 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (establishing that couples have a constitutional right to mar-
ital privacy under the Due Process Clause and holding that a law forbidding the use of 
contraceptives was unconstitutional because it intruded on that right). 
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crimination based on marital status.  The law in question permitted 
registered physicians and pharmacists to give married couples, but 
not unmarried individuals, access to contraceptives.45  Before as-
sessing the adequacy of the state’s proffered objectives and the law’s 
relation to them, the Court briefly explained and clarified the nature 
of the Equal Protection Clause.  Justice William Brennan wrote that 
the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to State [sic] the power to 
treat different classes of persons in different ways . . . .  The Equal Protec-
tion Clause of that amendment does, however, deny to State [sic] the 
power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed 
by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated 
to the objective of that statute.  A classification “must be reasonable, not 
arbitrary, and must rest on some ground of difference having a fair and 
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons sim-
ilarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”46 
This language, coupled with the Court’s description of the issue as 
“whether there is some ground of difference that rationally explains 
the different treatment accorded married and unmarried persons 
under” the laws in question, suggests that the Court applied only ra-
tional basis review in this case.47  Ultimately, the Court held that 
“the . . . statute cannot be upheld” given the state’s objectives48 be-
cause those objectives could not be “reasonably . . . regarded as its 
purpose.”49 
Relying on Griswold, the Court also held that “[i]f  . . . the distribu-
tion of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban 
on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissi-
ble.”50  The Court reasoned that “whatever the rights of the individual 
to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for 
the unmarried and the married alike” because “the marital couple is 
not an independent entity . . . but an association of two individuals 
each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.”51  Thus, 
“[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individ-
ual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted government in-
trusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the deci-
sion whether to bear or beget a child.”52  By reclassifying a married 
 
 45 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 441 (1972). 
 46 Id. at 447 (internal  citations omitted) (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1971)). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 452 (rejecting two of the state’s proffered objectives for the statute:  “a deterrent to 
fornication” or “a health measure”). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 443, 453. 
 51 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added). 
 52 Id. (emphasis added). 
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couple as two separate people instead of one single unit, the Baird 
Court showed that “married and unmarried persons . . . are similarly 
situated” and consequently cannot be treated differently, at least in 
matters of privacy, without violating the Equal Protection Clause.53  
While Baird dealt with a disadvantaging of unmarried couples, it is 
clear that this reclassification could be used in the reverse situation as 
well.  That is, if, compared with an unmarried couple, a married cou-
ple as a unit is disadvantaged by a law, after Baird that couple could 
argue that they are merely two individuals and are thus similarly situ-
ated to and should be treated like the unmarried couple who fare 
better under the regulation at issue. 
While Loving and Baird have significantly influenced the Court’s 
treatment of marriage-related issues, the most impactful case was de-
cided six years after Baird.  In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court struck 
down a Wisconsin law that prohibited “a certain class of Wisconsin 
residents,” namely non-custodial parents with either child support ob-
ligations or children who were or may become public charges, from 
marrying.54  In “looking to the nature of the classification and the in-
dividual interests affected,” the Court held that since “the right to 
marry is of fundamental importance, and since the classification at 
issue here significantly interferes with the exercise of that 
right . . . ‘critical examination’” of the law was required.55  However, 
the Court clarified that 
by reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do 
not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way 
to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to 
rigorous scrutiny.  To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not 
significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship 
may legitimately be imposed.  The statutory classification at issue here, 
however, clearly does interfere directly and substantially with the right to 
marry.56 
 
 53 Id. at 454–55. 
 54 434 U.S. 374, 376–77 (1978). 
 55 Id. at 383.  Notably, the Zablocki Court never actually used the words “strict scrutiny” to 
describe the test it was applying.  However, immediately after describing its test as a “criti-
cal examination,” the Court cited a number of cases, including Loving and Griswold, that 
applied strict scrutiny.  See id. at 383–86.  In addition, and more importantly, later in the 
opinion, before examining the interests advanced by Wisconsin, the Court wrote that 
“[w]hen a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamen-
tal right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests 
and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”  Id. at 388.  This language is es-
sentially the strict scrutiny test defined in other Equal Protection cases.  See supra notes 
28–29 and accompanying text.  Therefore, it is sufficient to categorize the Court’s test as 
one of strict scrutiny. 
 56 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386. 
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The language quoted above is critical for analyses of marital sta-
tus-based regulations because it firmly established that:  (1) the right 
to marry is a fundamental right; (2) when that right is directly, signif-
icantly, or substantially interfered with, heightened, if not strict, scru-
tiny must be applied; and (3) when that right is not significantly in-
terfered with, a lower level of scrutiny is appropriate.  However, while 
the case may have shown that an explicit prohibition on marriage for 
certain persons counts as a substantial interference, the meaning of 
Zablocki’s language and its implications are far from settled.  As Parts 
III and IV will show, the meanings of the second and third points in 
particular are still at issue today. 
III.  ANALYSES OF MARITAL STATUS DISTINCTIONS UNDER THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES 
As in Baird, many parties who challenge laws on the basis of mari-
tal status discrimination claim that married couples are being unjustly 
favored over single individuals; in other words, they argue that un-
married individuals are unconstitutionally burdened.  However, this 
Comment examines cases in which married couples bring suits claim-
ing that they are burdened, that they are not receiving equal protec-
tion under the law as compared with unmarried citizens, and that 
their liberty interests are being unjustly infringed.  While some viola-
tions have been found, in two specific and not entirely separate sub-
ject areas “constitutional attack has been” consistently “unavailing:”  
tax law and the distribution of government benefits.57 
A.  Tax Law 
When married couples challenge the marital status distinctions 
found in tax laws, they are challenging the constitutionality of what is 
known as the “marriage penalty—a curious feature of the tax system 
whereby the tax liability of a married couple may exceed that of a co-
habitating unmarried couple.”58  However, this penalty did not always 
exist.59  In fact, the “present state of inequity in the tax law is actually 
 
 57 See, e.g., Druker v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 697 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1982) (explain-
ing the failure of constitutional attacks on the marriage penalty). 
 58 Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marriage Penalty:  The Working Couple’s Dilemma, 47 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 27, 27 (1978). 
 59 See Antoinette M. Pilzner, Tax Liability Differences Between Married and Unmarried Couples:  
Do the Married Filing Statuses Violate Equal Protection?, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1337, 1338–39 
(1994) (“As originally implemented, married individuals were taxed as separate taxpay-
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a reversal of the positions of married and unmarried taxpayers under 
the original individual income tax, at which time married taxpayers 
were taxed separately under the same rate schedule as unmarried in-
dividuals.”60  However, under the original system, two married cou-
ples who, combined, had the same income could potentially have dif-
ferent tax liabilities.61  This resulted in a “geographic disparity” 
between couples who resided in community property states and those 
who resided in common law states.62  Only in the former were mar-
ried couples allowed to split their incomes.63  Thus, to prevent all 
states from adopting a community property regime, “Congress 
amended the Code in 1948 to incorporate the income-splitting bene-
fits of community property rules into the tax rates,” effectively substi-
tuting “the family for the individual as the unit of taxation.”64 
Yet, while this amendment allowed for equality between married 
taxpayers, it did not change the fact that married couples who filed 
joint returns still used the same tax schedules as unmarried persons.65  
Because married couples only “applied the rates to half of their total 
income and doubled the resulting tax . . . single taxpayers found 
themselves with tax liabilities as high as 141% of the joint liability of 
married couples with the same total income.”66  Backlash from this 
result caused Congress to once again alter the tax system in 1969 so 
that the single taxpayer now had “no more than a 20% differential 
between his tax liability and that of a married couple with the same 
taxable income.”67  This alteration created what is known today as the 
marriage penalty.68 
As a number of scholars have observed, “[m]arriage does not al-
ways give rise to a tax penalty; in some cases it results in a tax sav-
 
ers, thereby reporting only their respective incomes when determining their tax liabil-
ity.”). 
 60 Id. at 1337. 
 61 Id. at 1339 (explaining how different rules under common law and community property 
states led to differential taxation of couples with the same income). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. (explaining that in community property states “married couples were allowed to even-
ly split their combined income,” but in common law states, “married couples . . . were not 
allowed to duplicate the income-splitting benefits”).  Notably, the Supreme Court upheld 
the practice of income splitting.  See Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958, 965 (N.D. 
Ind. 1976) (citing Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930)). 
 64 Pilzner, supra note 59, at 1339; Gerzog, supra note 58, at 30. 
 65 Pilzner, supra note 59, at 1339 (explaining that after the 1948 amendment “unmarried 
taxpayers and married taxpayers filing joint returns still used the same tax rate sched-
ule”). 
 66 Id. at 1339–40. 
 67 Gerzog, supra note 58, at 30–31. 
 68 See id. at 31. 
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ings.”69  The marriage penalty arises in situations, like Kelly’s and Bry-
an’s, in which both spouses work and generate income.70  While the 
penalty begins to take effect “when each spouse contributes at least 
20% of the couple’s total income,” it “is greatest when the incomes of 
the two spouses are equal.”71  Thus, if two individuals make roughly 
the same amount of money, the tax law increases their tax burden 
simply because they are married.72  Conversely, if they remained sin-
gle, even if they cohabitated, their tax burdens would be lower. 
The first case to challenge the constitutionality of the marriage 
penalty was Johnson v. United States.73  The plaintiffs primarily relied on 
Hoeper v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin,74 a Supreme Court case that 
struck down a Wisconsin law that computed a married couple’s tax 
burden based upon “the combined average taxable income” of both 
spouses regardless of whether the couple filed separate returns or a 
joint return.75  The Supreme Court in Hoeper held that “any attempt 
by a state to measure the tax on one person’s property or income by 
reference to the property or income of another is contrary to due 
process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”76  The 
Court rejected the government’s arguments that the law was a regula-
tion of marriage and was needed to prevent fraud and tax evasion.77  
When addressing the argument that married couples could be treat-
ed differently because they enjoyed more benefits than single taxpay-
ers, the Court expressly stated that “[i]t can hardly be claimed that a 
mere difference in social relations so alters the taxable status of one 
receiving income as to justify a different measure for the tax.”78  In 
other words, the Court held that one’s social status (married or sin-
gle) cannot affect one’s tax status and cannot be determinative of the 
 
 69 Id. at 27. 
 70 Id. at 28. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Gerzog, supra note 58, at 28 (observing that tax burdens increase for spouses earning 
equal amounts of money “simply because they choose to maintain their incomes after 
marriage”). 
 73 422 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Gerzog, supra note 58, at 37. 
 74 284 U.S. 206 (1931). 
 75 Id. at 213. 
 76 Id. at 215. 
 77 See id. at 216–17 (stating that rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution are superior 
to the “claimed necessity” behind exaction). 
 78 Id. at 217 (rejecting the argument that “a difference of treatment of married as compared 
with single persons . . . may be due to the greater and different privileges enjoyed by the 
former”).  This language, though used much earlier, is quite similar to the Court’s in 
Baird, which held that a married couple is comprised of two separate individuals, thus 
making them similarly situated to non-married persons.  See supra note 53 and accompa-
nying text. 
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amount of taxes he or she pays.  Thus, the law was struck down for 
making an arbitrary distinction, thereby rendering it unreasonable 
and a due process violation.79 
However, the Johnson court strongly distinguished its case from 
Hoeper.  It did so by noting that “under Wisconsin’s statute [at issue in 
Hoeper], regardless of which type of return was selected, the tax was 
assessed on the couple’s aggregate income.  The federal law [at issue 
here], on the other hand, contains no such compulsory income ag-
gregation provision.”80  Rather, married couples could file separate 
returns and have their tax burden assessed on their own individual 
income or file joint returns and have their burden assessed on their 
combined income.81  Of course, the court either disregarded or 
“failed to recognize that, although this option exists, the tax system 
does not permit married persons filing separately to use the lower 
rates provided for single individuals and that, therefore, the option 
may not be a meaningful alternative.”82  Nevertheless, the court found 
Hoeper inapposite due to the married individual’s ability to file a sepa-
rate return. 
In addition, while the Johnson court did recognize that marriage is 
a fundamental right, it also observed that “the federal government 
traditionally has had very broad classification powers in the taxation 
field,”83 presumably indicating, contrary to Hoeper, that married and 
unmarried taxpayers can be treated differently for tax purposes.  In 
determining the level of scrutiny, the court found that it “must take 
into account not only the importance attached to the right of mar-
riage but also the inherently complex nature of legislative decisions 
 
 79 Hoeper, 284 U.S. at 218 (“It is obvious that the act does not purport to regulate the status 
or relationships of any person, natural or artificial.  Arbitrary and discriminatory provi-
sions contained in it cannot be justified by calling them special regulations of the persons 
or relationships which are the object of the discrimination.  The present case does not fall 
within the principle that where the legislature, in prohibiting a traffic or transaction as 
being against the policy of the state, makes a classification, reasonable in itself, its power 
so to do is not to be denied simply because some innocent article comes within the pro-
scribed class . . . . Taxing one person for the property of another is a different matter.  
There is no room for the suggestion that qua the appellant and those similarly situated 
the act is a reasonable regulation, rather than a tax law . . . . The exaction is arbitrary, and 
is a denial of due process.”).  Notably, the Court did not specify which level of scrutiny 
was being applied, but due to the emphasis on reasonableness, it can be inferred that ra-
tional basis review was employed. 
 80 Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958, 967–68 (N.D. Ind. 1976). 
 81 See id. at 968 (“If married persons each elect to file separate returns, each may do so, and 
the tax computed is based solely upon each taxpayer’s own separate income.”). 
 82 Gerzog, supra note 58, at 38. 
 83 Johnson, 422 F. Supp. at 971. 
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in the field of taxation.”84  Beyond this sentence however, the court 
did not make clear what level of scrutiny it was actually applying.  
However, its language suggests that it applied a form of strict scruti-
ny.85  That is, the court ultimately held that because Congress had 
“legitimate legislative goals of reducing the differential between sin-
gle and married taxpayers and of maintaining equal taxes for equal 
income married couples, it is obvious that the Government has a com-
pelling interest to justify this legislation.”86  Furthermore, the court 
found that “it is unclear that ‘less drastic means’ existed which would 
have achieved these same legislative goals.”87  In other words, the 
court found that the law was narrowly tailored to achieve compelling 
interests, and therefore satisfied a strict scrutiny test.88 
Two years after Johnson, the United States Court of Claims ad-
dressed the marriage penalty in Mapes v. United States.89  Unlike John-
son, this case was definitively decided under the Equal Protection 
Clause.  Using recently-decided Zablocki, the court found that “appli-
cation of strict scrutiny is appropriate only where the obstacle to mar-
riage is a direct one, i.e., one that operates to preclude marriage en-
tirely for a certain class of people.”90  Thus, because “[t]he additional 
tax liability suffered by two-income couples who cannot avail them-
selves of the rates for single persons is an indirect burden on the exer-
cise of the right to marry,” presumably because it does not definitively 
and explicitly prohibit people from marrying, the court found that 
only rational basis review was appropriate.91  Applying many of the 
same considerations as the Johnson court, though using a lower stand-
ard, the Mapes court held that the federal tax law satisfied rational ba-
sis review.92  Interestingly though, the court declined to state why the 
law was rationally related to a legitimate state interest.  Instead, the 
 
 84 Id. 
 85 See Gerzog, supra note 58, at 38 (observing that the Johnson court “found the strict scrutiny 
test appropriate to determine the law’s constitutionality,” although “the court effectively 
retreated from applying that standard”). 
 86 Johnson, 422 F. Supp. at 973 (emphasis added). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Interestingly, however, the court did not note under which clause this law was constitu-
tional.  That is, while it recognized that the plaintiffs brought the fundamental rights 
claim under the Due Process Clause, the court, when discussing levels of scrutiny, spoke 
of “the classification scheme” at issue in the case, which would indicate an equal protec-
tion analysis.  Id. at 969, 971, 974. 
 89 576 F.2d 896, 897–98 (Ct. Cl. 1978). 
 90 Id. at 901. 
 91 Id. at 901–02 (emphasis added). 
 92 Id. at 904 (“[W]e are satisfied that the present provisions pass a minimum rationality test, 
and should be upheld as constitutional.”). 
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court focused on what was not unreasonable about the legislation (ra-
ther than why it was reasonable) and on the complexities of tax struc-
ture.93 
The last major case to address this issue was Druker v. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue,94 decided by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  
Despite the fact that the plaintiffs in this case had actually divorced to 
avoid the marriage penalty, the Druker court reaffirmed the finding of 
the Mapes court that the marriage penalty was only an indirect obsta-
cle to marriage because it did not expressly prevent two people from 
marrying.95  However, while this court also applied the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, unlike the Mapes court, the Druker court refrained from 
identifying which standard of scrutiny it was applying to the marriage 
penalty.  Rather, the court explained the challenges faced by Con-
gress in creating a fair and equitable tax law and simply concluded 
that “[t]here is nothing in the equal protection clause that required” 
Congress to avoid the marriage penalty.96  Only after reaching this 
conclusion did the court add that the objectives sought by Congress’s 
1969 amendment to the tax law “were clearly compelling,” and there-
fore “the tax rate schedules . . . can survive even the ‘rigorous scruti-
ny’ reserved by Zablocki for measures which ‘significantly interfere’ 
with the right to marry.”97  Thus, while the court declined to identify a 
level of scrutiny that should be applied to these cases, this sentence 
makes clear that the Druker court believed that no matter what the 
level of scrutiny applied, the tax law would survive it. 
Together, Johnson, Mapes, and Druker, while all decided by differ-
ent courts, comprise the main cases that have addressed the marriage 
tax penalty.  While they ultimately all reached the same result and 
upheld the constitutionality of the marriage penalty, their rationales 
and the standards of review they applied were inconsistent and often 
unclear or absent.98  Nevertheless, their holdings have been and con-
 
 93 Id. (“The policy of taxing all couples with equal incomes equally . . . is not unreasonable.  
Nor is it unreasonable to attempt to tax the household economies enjoyed by married 
people . . . . We in the judiciary, are neither equipped nor inclined to second guess the 
legislature in its determination of appropriate tax policies.”). But see infra note 123 and 
accompanying text (explaining that, ordinarily, in performing a rational basis scrutiny 
there is no need to inquire into the motivation of the legislature). 
 94 697 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 95 Id. at 50 (noting that the adverse effects of the marriage penalty are “merely indirect” and 
“not an attempt to interfere with an individual’s freedom to marry”). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 In sum, Johnson applied strict scrutiny, but was unclear about whether the law was consti-
tutional under due process or equal protection.  See Johnson v. United States, 422 F. 
Supp. 958, 971 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (applying strict scrutiny).  Mapes was decided under the 
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tinue to be used in subsequent cases that address challenges to mari-
tal status distinctions in tax laws.99 
B.  Government Benefits 
Courts’ treatment of the allocation of government benefits based 
on marital status has been similar to their treatment of tax laws that 
distinguish between single and married persons.  Perhaps the most 
famous and widely cited of these cases is Califano v. Jobst.100  Reaching 
the Supreme Court during the same period as the main tax cases dis-
cussed above, Jobst, which was decided under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment, addressed whether Congress could mandate 
that secondary social security disability benefits101 terminate upon a 
person marrying, even if his or her spouse was also a disabled per-
son.102  As with the tax cases, not all secondary social security disability 
beneficiaries were harmed by this law.103  Rather, if a person receiving 
secondary social security disability benefits married a person who was 
also receiving social security disability benefits, neither recipient 
would have his or her benefits terminated.104  On the other hand, re-
cipients, such as Mr. Jobst, who married non-beneficiaries, lost their 
benefits permanently upon marriage.105  The Court admitted that 
 
Equal Protection Clause, but only applied rational basis review.  See Mapes v. United 
States, 576 F.2d 896, 901–02  (Ct. Cl. 1978) (applying rational basis review).  Lastly, Druker 
was also decided under the Equal Protection Clause, but declined to specify the appro-
priate level of scrutiny, though it did say that the law would survive strict scrutiny.  See 
Druker, 697 F.2d at 50 (explaining that there was nothing in the Equal Protection Clause 
that prohibited the marriage penalty). 
 99 See, e.g., Rinier v. State, 641 A.2d 276, 282 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1994) (citing to Mapes to up-
hold a New Jersey law that mandated that married couples who filed a joint federal tax re-
turn also file a joint state return). 
100 434 U.S. 47 (1977). 
101 The term “secondary social security benefits” indicates that the person receiving the ben-
efits is not the disabled worker, but rather a family member of a disabled worker.  In addi-
tion, this case only discussed social security disability insurance benefits and that is all that 
is being discussed in this Comment.  This should not be confused with supplemental se-
curity income, the qualifications and disquialifications for which are very different and 
are not addressed here.  For the differences between the two programs, see Beth Lau-
rence, Social Security Disability (SSDI) and SSI?, DISABILITY SECRETS, http://www.
disabilitysecrets.com/page5-13.html. 
102 Jobst, 434 U.S. at 48. 
103 Id. at 49 (explaining how not all beneficiaries would lose benefits). 
104 Id. 
105 Id.  This result would still occur today.  See Alison Barjaktarovich, Social Security Disability 
and Getting Married:  Will It Affect Disability Benefits?, DISABILITY SECRETS, http://www.
disabilitysecrets.com/page6-37.html (“If you are an adult disabled child receiving benefits 
under your parent’s work record, getting married will cause your SSDI benefits to stop.”).  
Secondary social security disability benefits are also terminated upon marriage if the dis-
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while secondary social security disability “benefits were intended to 
provide persons dependent on the wage earner with protection 
against the economic hardship occasioned by the loss of the wage 
earner’s support” (should the wage earner pass away), receipt was not 
based on actual need or dependency.106  Rather, “Congress . . . elected 
to use simple criteria, such as age and marital status, to determine 
probable dependency.”107  Thus, because he married, Mr. Jobst was 
deemed less likely to need financial support in the form of social se-
curity than if he had remained single.  The fact that his spouse was 
also disabled prior to marriage (and hence was also a needy person) 
was inconsequential.108  In other words, in the eyes of the law, two 
needy, dependent individuals somehow became more financially in-
dependent simply by virtue of marrying. 
However, the Court found that “[t]here is no question about the 
power of Congress to legislate on the basis of such factual assump-
tions.”109  In fact, the Court held that “[g]eneral rules,” such as the 
one enacted here, “are essential if a fund of this magnitude is to be 
administered with a modicum of efficiency, even though such rules 
inevitably produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some indi-
vidual cases.”110 
Yet, despite this allowance for “arbitrary consequences,” the Court 
was quick to note that “a general rule may not define the benefited 
class by reference to a distinction which irrationally differentiates be-
tween identically situated persons.”111  Thus, if the law had classified 
on the basis of “race, religion, or political affiliation,” it would be 
struck down.112  However, the Court held that “a distinction between 
married persons and unmarried persons is of a different character” 
because “[b]oth tradition and common experience support the con-
clusion that marriage is an event which normally marks an important 
 
abled worker was the recipient’s ex-spouse.  See id. (“If you are receiving Social Security 
benefits under your ex-spouse’s work record, getting married will cause your benefit 
payments to stop. . . .  If you are a divorced spouse receiving benefits on your deceased 
ex-spouse’s work record, you’ll lose these benefits if you get remarried before age 60 (or 
before age 50 if you are disabled).”). 
106 Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 50–52 (1977). 
107 Id. at 52 (emphasis added). 
108 See id. at 56–57 (acknowledging but rejecting the plaintiff's argument that, because his 
spouse was also disabled, his benefits should not have been terminated). 
109 Id. at 53. 
110 Id. 
111 Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53 (1977) 
112 Id. (explaining that differences in race, religion or political affiliation could not rationally 
justify distinctions in benefits). 
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change in economic status.”113  Thus, while there may be cases, per-
haps even many cases, for which this assumption does not hold true, 
the Court reasoned that “there can be no question about the validity 
of the assumption that a married person is less likely to be dependent 
on his parents for support than one who is unmarried.”114 
However, while the Court recognized that there were differences 
between classifying based on race and based on marital status, it 
failed to explicitly identify the test to which it was subjecting the law.  
Instead, it held that “[s]ince it was rational for Congress to assume that 
marital status is a relevant test of probable dependency, the general 
rule . . . terminating all . . . benefits when the beneficiary married, sat-
isfied the constitutional test normally applied in cases like this.”115  
From this language, it appears the Court applied a test akin to ration-
al basis review.  Furthermore, the Court found that although the law 
may deter marriage, it could not be characterized “as an attempt to 
interfere with the individual’s freedom to” exercise his fundamental 
right to marry.116  Thus, the fundamental right argument could not be 
used to successfully to raise the level of scrutiny applied.  Conse-
quently, despite the facts of the case, the law and the distinctions it 
created were upheld as constitutional exercises of Congress’s powers 
that did not violate due process, based upon “rational” traditions, 
probabilities, and assumptions. 
Social Security is not the only context in which courts have upheld 
marital status as a legitimate classification upon which to base the dis-
tribution of government benefits.  In Women Involved in Farm Econom-
ics v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia addressed an equal protection challenge 
to a law that imposed a per-person limit on funds that could be dis-
tributed to farmers, but in doing so, defined a husband and wife as 
one person.117  Under the law, the limit that a single person could re-
ceive at the time this case was brought was $50,000 per year.118  How-
ever, “[i]n order to be considered a separate” or single “person for 
the purpose of the payment limitation,” an individual must meet 
three requirements:  (1) “[h]ave a separate and distinct interest in 
the land or crop involved[;]” (2) “[e]xercise separate responsibility 
for such interest[;]” and (3) have a separate account for the cost of 
 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 53–54 (emphasis added). 
116 Id. at 54. 
117 876 F.2d 994, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
118 Id. at 996. 
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farming from which all other individuals are excluded.119  Therefore, 
numerous people who operated the same farm, such as business 
partners, could still qualify as separate persons under the Act, and 
each could be eligible to receive the maximum $50,000 annual pay-
ment.120  But married couples, unless they had unrelated farming in-
terests prior to marriage, were absolutely barred from being consid-
ered as separate persons, even if they could meet the three 
requirements.121  Consequently, under the law, two individuals who 
lived together and shared all personal expenses could still receive 
separate payments as long as they were not married and met the stat-
utory requirements.  Yet, married individuals, solely by virtue of their 
marriage, could not. 
Relying on Zablocki, the court applied rational basis review because 
it found that the classification did not directly or substantially inter-
fere with a person’s fundamental right to marry.122  In applying this 
standard, the court, citing various Supreme Court cases, noted that 
“[o]rdinarily, there is no necessity in rational-basis scrutiny for a sep-
arate inquiry into the legislature’s actual motivation [for passing the 
law in question], for the legislature’s subjective motivation does not 
undermine a classification’s validity provided legitimate motivations 
are conceivable.”123  Thus, Congress’s stated interests of (1) “encour-
aging maximum participation in agricultural stabilization efforts” and 
(2) ensuring fair and reasonable application of the benefit program, 
were more than adequate to satisfy the conceivable “legitimate inter-
est” component of rational basis review.124 
Furthermore, the court approvingly held “that the regulation” did 
nothing “more . . . than assume that, whatever their roles, married 
men and women constitute one economic unit.”125  Since this assump-
tion had already been upheld in Jobst,126 the court concluded that 
Congress . . . has reasonably determined that married couples . . . are 
more likely than other ‘partners’ in farming enterprises to share com-
pletely in the products of their efforts—in other words, to be economical-
ly interdependent—and the Constitution requires no more precision 
than this in the circumstances we confront.127 
 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Women Involved in Farm Econ., 876 F.2d at 1004. 
123 Id. at 1005. 
124 Id. at 996–97. 
125 Id. at 1005. 
126 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
127 Women Involved in Farm Econ., 876 F.2d at 1007. 
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Thus, despite the absolute bar and the potentially arbitrary conse-
quences it could produce, the law satisfied rational basis review and 
was upheld against the equal protection challenge, based, once again, 
on likelihoods and assumptions.128 
Together, Jobst and Women Involved in Farm Economics show that 
courts are very willing to allow Congress to condition the receipt of 
government benefits upon a person’s marital status, since under both 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses such laws are only sub-
ject to rational basis scrutiny because they do “not involve a suspect 
classification” and do not substantially “affect a fundamental right.”129  
In addition, perhaps because of the level of scrutiny applied, as in the 
tax cases, the courts have been unsympathetic to the specific facts as-
serted by the plaintiffs regarding the effects the laws have on their 
particular relationships.  Instead, courts defer to Congress’s determi-
nation of probabilities and assumptions regarding financial depend-
ency.  Relying on these determinations, both state and federal courts 
in subsequent cases have reached similar results in the government 
benefit context.130 
C.  School Activity Regulations:  A Counterpoint 
As the cases above show, since the 1970s, at least in the tax and 
government benefits contexts, courts have made it clear that they will 
uphold marital status distinctions that in effect disfavor married cou-
 
128 Id.; Debra Kahn, Constitutional Law—Perpetuating the Presumption of Marital Interdependence 
Under the Agricultural Act—Women Involved in Farm Economics v. United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 881, 887 (1990) (“[T]he United States Court of 
Appeals for the District Court of Columbia Circuit found that the regulatory presumption 
that married persons constitute a distinct economic unit for purposes of farm subsidies 
was rationally related to the legitimate government objectives of efficiency and preventing 
evasion of the payment limitations.”). 
129 Conklin v. Shinpoch, 730 P.2d 643, 647 (Wash. 1986). 
130 See, e.g., Smith v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 235, 240 (7th Cir. 1993) affirming Smith v. Sullivan, 767 F. 
Supp. 186, 190 (C.D. Ill. 1991) (“It is sufficient [in government benefits context] that the 
classification is rationally related to the legitimate goals set forth by Congress.”); Munoz v. 
Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that Congress was “free to draw the 
distinction it did” because Congress had a rational concern in preventing couples from 
pretending to be legally separated, but still living together, from getting more govern-
ment funds than legally married couples who live together); Conklin, 730 P.2d at 651 
(Dore, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority held “that the Department of Social and 
Health Services can deny the State’s [General Assistance--Unemployable] financial help 
to disabled persons, who but for their marital status to SSI recipients would receive such 
aid.”); Attorney General v. Civil Service Comm’n, No. 306685, 2013 WL 85805, at *4 
(Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2013) (“The exclusion of the cited groups from the . . . benefits 
policy does not clearly demonstrate that the policy is arbitrary or unrelated to the state’s 
interests.”). 
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ples and impose burdens that such persons only suffer because they 
chose to enter marital unions.  However, in other circumstances 
courts have found that this classification and the burdens it imposes 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
One area in which courts have consistently struck down laws that 
burden married but not unmarried individuals is regulations that re-
strict participation in school activities.  For example, in Bell v. Lone 
Oak Independent School District,131 the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas 
held that a school regulation that prohibited all married students 
from participating in extracurricular activities violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.132  Here, the court applied strict scrutiny analysis and 
required “the school district to show that its rule should be upheld as 
a necessary restraint to promote a compelling state interest.”133  As 
support for application of this standard, as opposed to rational basis 
review, the court observed that 
[t]here can be no doubt in anyone’s mind that if the same rule provided 
that a particular race or color of person would be ineligible to play foot-
ball, the state courts and federal courts would promptly strike the rule 
down as being discriminatory towards a class of individuals.  The same 
logic applies to married students’ participation in extra-curricular activi-
ties.134 
Interestingly, it was this exact comparison between race and marital 
status that the Jobst Court declined to make when it found that ra-
tional basis review was the appropriate test.135 
The Bell court also provided some interesting dicta concerning 
public policy and marriage.  It noted that 
[i]t is the public policy of this state to encourage marriage rather than 
living together unmarried . . . and through the years [this state 
has] . . . jealously guarded the bonds of matrimony.  It therefore seems il-
logical to say that a school district can make a rule punishing a student 
for entering into a status authorized and sanctioned by the laws of this 
state.  We find no logical basis for such rule.136 
While this reasoning was certainly not the sole basis for the court’s 
decision, it seems to have contributed to the court’s analysis. 
Ultimately, because the school district could show neither a clear 
connection to the proffered interest of preventing drop-outs nor “a 
clear and present danger to the other students,” the faculty, or the 
 
131 507 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. 1974). 
132 Id. at 638. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
136 Bell, 507 S.W.2d at 638. 
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school system itself, the court held that “the evidence is legally insuf-
ficient to establish that the rule in question is a necessary restraint to 
promote a compelling state interest . . . .”137  Therefore, the rule was 
struck down as an  equal protection violation.138 
While some differences between the school activities and the 
tax/government benefit cases are facially and overwhelmingly obvi-
ous, the former serve as interesting and helpful points of comparison 
when trying to discern the courts’ rationales in the tax and govern-
ment benefit cases.  First, they show that courts will not always uphold 
distinctions based upon marital status that burden married individu-
als.  Second, in striking down the school regulations, courts have 
been willing to impose strict scrutiny analyses because they held that 
regulations pertain to and burden the fundamental right to marry.139  
However, courts have specifically declined to find such burdens in 
the tax and government benefits contexts.  Thus, in some ways, these 
analyses, rationales, and results seem to directly contradict the tax 
and government benefit cases.  Why do courts engage in such drasti-
cally different reasoning?  Why are challenges in some fields success-
ful and others are not?  And why is there a lack of clear constitutional 
analysis in one type of cases but not in the other?  In the next Part, 
this Comment will compare these cases further and offer four poten-
tial reasons. 
IV.  POTENTIAL REASONS FOR THE DIFFERENT TREATMENT OF MARITAL 
STATUS 
As we have seen, “courts have generally been unsympathetic to” 
married persons “subject to” tax and government benefits penalties.140  
However, given that governments and courts have generally sought to 
 
137 Id. 
138 Id.  Notably, rules very similar to the one at issue in Bell have been struck down by federal 
courts using the same rationales.  See, e.g., Holt v. Shelton, 341 F. Supp. 821, 823 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1972) (striking down a regulation that prohibited married students from partici-
pating in all school activities except classes after subjecting the regulation to strict scruti-
ny since it infringed on the fundamental right to marry and finding that “the sole pur-
pose and effect of the regulation is to discourage . . . marriages which are perfectly legal 
under the laws of Tennessee and which are thus fully consonant with the public policy of 
that State”); Romans v. Crenshaw, 354 F. Supp. 868, 869 (D.C. Tex. 1972) (striking down 
a regulation that prohibits married or formerly married students from participating in ex-
tracurricular activities as violative of equal protection despite the school district’s argu-
ments that the regulation served to achieve the interests of preventing “fraternization by 
married students” and “undue interest in and discussion of sex by unmarried students”). 
139 See supra note 138. 
140 Gerzog, supra note 58, at 28. 
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promote the institution of marriage,141 it is interesting to question 
“[w]hat public polic[ies are] served by th[ese] restriction[s].”142  What 
are the courts’ reasons, both constitutional and political, for unques-
tioningly upholding the tax and government benefit marriage penal-
ties?  Since the courts’ rationales in these cases have been shown to 
be inconsistent both amongst themselves and with other marital sta-
tus cases (namely, the school activities cases just discussed), in order 
to answer these questions, it is necessary to examine the cases closely 
to draw out common language and themes.  This Comment suggests 
that there are at least four potential explanations for courts’ rejection 
of equal protection and due process challenges to marital status dis-
crimination in the tax and government benefits contexts:  (1) the na-
ture of taxation and government benefit distribution, both their 
complexities and courts’ position relative to them; (2) the difficulty 
of applying the right-to-marry precedents discussed in Part I; (3) 
courts’ belief in a deference to the assumption that marriage does 
and should privatize dependency; and (4) the existence of many oth-
er benefits that advantage married couples compared to singles.  This 
Part will both explore each potential reason and critique its sound-
ness, particularly with respect to societal changes over the past several 
decades. 
A.  The Nature of Taxation and Government Benefit Distribution 
The first reason that courts may treat the burdens placed on mar-
ried couples differently in the tax and government benefit contexts as 
opposed to other contexts concerns the subject matter itself.  Tax 
and government benefit schemes are inherently complex.  Their op-
erations are difficult for even judges to understand.  Particularly in 
the tax opinions, courts rely on this fact to support their rejection of 
 
141 See e.g., Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“Marriage . . . [is] fundamental to the 
very existence and survival of the race.”); Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“With-
out doubt, it [the Fourteenth Amendment] denotes . . . the right . . . to marry . . . and 
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law to the orderly pursuit 
of happiness by free men.”); Peden v. State, 930 P.2d 1, 17 (Kan. 1996) (recognizing that 
promoting marriage is “a valid state objective”); Bell, 507 S.W.2d at 638 (“It is the public 
policy of this state to encourage marriage rather than living together unmarried . . . and 
through the years [we] have jealously guarded the bonds of matrimony.”); Robert E. 
Rains, Disability and Family Relationships:  Marriage Penalties & Support Anomalies, 22 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 561, 595 (2006) (quoting President George W. Bush’s speech during “Marriage 
Protection Week” in 2003 in which he said, “Marriage is a sacred institution, and its pro-
tection is essential to the continued strength of our society.”). 
142 Rains, supra note 141, at 564. 
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equal protection and due process challenges.143  For example, the 
Johnson court acknowledged its own “lack of expertise in the complex 
arena of taxation.”144  Consequently, partly because judges struggle to 
understand these subject areas, they are unlikely to find constitution-
al violations.145 
More importantly, the subject area presents a problem for judges 
because it does not lend itself to obvious, clear-cut solutions.  As a 
number of scholars have acknowledged, in the case of taxes, Congress 
must choose between a set of competing interests, namely, a progres-
sive tax scheme, horizontal equity,146 and ability to pay.147  The Druker 
court observed that “it is simply impossible to design a progressive tax 
regime in which all married couples of equal aggregate income are 
taxed equally and in which an individual’s tax liability is unaffected by 
changes in marital status.”148  Similarly, the Mapes court recognized 
that “the perplexities of shaping a legislative scheme which distrib-
utes the incidence of the personal income tax equitably between 
married and single taxpayers have confounded Congress for many 
years.”149 
This difficulty, coupled with the typical treatment of economic 
legislation,150 has generally affected (by lowering) the level of scrutiny 
 
143 See, e.g., Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 904 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (“We in the judiciary, are 
neither equipped nor inclined to second guess the legislature in its determination of ap-
propriate tax policies.”); Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958, 974 (N.D. Ind. 1976) 
(“[T]his court finds itself ill-equipped to judge the merits of plaintiffs’ suggestions or of 
the many others which might be offered.”); Gerzog, supra note 58, at 39–40 (describing 
the court’s acknowledgement of “their own lack of expertise” in the tax cases and their 
resulting deferral to Congress); Pilzner, supra note 59, at 1343 (highlighting that the John-
son court “[a]cknowledg[ed] the complexity of the [Tax] Code”);   see also Califano v. 
Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 56–57 (1977) (acknowledging that Congress’s rule is easy to imple-
ment). 
144 Johnson, 422 F. Supp. at 971. 
145 This is further supported by the fact that, in the area of taxation, courts have also upheld 
tax penalties on unmarried persons, thus illustrating that courts are extremely hesitant to 
delve into this subject where classification based on marital status is at issue.  See, e.g., 
Kellems v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 58 T.C. 556, 558–59 (T.C. 1972) (upholding the 
constitutionality of a penalty on unmarried people where there was “no evidence submit-
ted showing the intent of Congress was to regulate or restrict or penalize persons who are 
not married”); Peden v. State, 930 P.2d 1, 18 (Kan. 1996) (upholding a singles tax penalty 
under rational basis review because it was rationally related to the legitimate state objec-
tive of encouraging singles to marry and stay married). 
146 Horizontal equity refers to the idea “that persons similarly situated be equally taxed.”  
Gerzog, supra note 58, at 33. 
147 Id. at 31. 
148 Druker v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 697 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1982). 
149 Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 899 (Ct. Cl. 1978). 
150 Recall that economic legislation is usually accorded rational basis review.  See supra note 
17 and accompanying text. 
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courts impose on such laws.151  It also affects how that lower standard 
is applied.  For example, the Johnson court wrote that 
[a]bsent the complexities of the Internal Revenue Code, the Govern-
ment would normally bear the burden of demonstrating that no less 
burdensome means exist which would satisfy its interests.  Theoretically, a 
better answer than the present tax structure may exist[,] one which ei-
ther does not burden the plaintiffs or which burdens them to a lesser ex-
tent.  But the tax system is an ‘arena in which no perfect alternatives ex-
ist.’ [citation omitted] Given this fact, this court cannot require the 
Government to demonstrate more convincingly than it has that no less 
burdensome means exist.152 
The same “difficulty” argument has been made in regards to the 
distribution of government benefits, since it concerns the allocation 
of finite funds.153  For example, the Women Involved in Farm Economics 
court “reasoned that it would be difficult for the Secretary of Agricul-
ture to ascertain the extent to which a husband and wife have made 
separate economic contributions” to the farm.154  Thus, the level of 
review needed to survive constitutional scrutiny may be lowered and 
courts may be more willing to defer to legislative “expertise.” 
These difficulties can be contrasted with the school activities cases 
in which a simple, easy to implement solution was available.  That is, 
by allowing married couples to participate in extracurricular activi-
ties, the unmarried students do not have rights or benefits taken away 
from them.  As was shown, this is not true in the tax context because 
“tax disparities will exist no matter how the rates are structured.”155  
Therefore, removing the marriage penalty would result in unequal 
taxes for singles.  Someone will always be disadvantaged; “[t]his is 
simply the nature of the beast.”156  Similarly, in the government bene-
fit context, distribution to one person may result in another person 
receiving fewer financial benefits.  In addition, there are “administra-
tive difficulties . . . in formulating . . . exception[s] that [would] al-
low[] for separate treatment of” married couples, such as the Jobsts, 
 
151 See Mapes, 576 F.2d at 903 (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 41 (1973)) (“In such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives exist, the 
Court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard of scrutiny lest all . . . fiscal 
schemes become subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
152 Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958, 974 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (quoting San Antonio 
Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. at 41). 
153 See, e.g., Conklin v. Shinpoch, 730 P.2d 643, 649, 651 (Wash. 1986) (recognizing that clas-
sifications “involving finite state funds must be treated with deference,” that “the United 
States Supreme Court has considered the finite character of funds in upholding econom-
ic classifications,” and that “limitations are necessary in any public assistance program”). 
154 Kahn, supra note 128, at 887. 
155 Mapes, 576 F.2d at 904. 
156 Id. 
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who do not fit the presumed marriage mold of becoming more eco-
nomically stable upon marriage.157  No such separate treatment would 
be necessary in the school activities context.  It seems clear that these 
considerations and difficulties at least contribute to courts’ different 
treatment of marital status in the tax and government benefit areas 
and their willingness not to require “mathematically perfect jus-
tice.”158 
Furthermore, when addressing taxation and government benefits, 
courts are also concerned that these are areas in which “the federal 
government traditionally has had very broad classification powers.”159  
The Johnson court specifically expressed concern about “abrogat[ing] 
the constitutional taxing power of Congress.”160  Similarly, in Women 
Involved in Farm Economics, the court found that judicial intervention 
is warranted “only if Congress’ choice in imposing burdens or erect-
ing classifications represents a display of arbitrary power, not an exer-
cise of judgment.”161  Since the courts in these cases have found “no 
evidence that Congress intended to burden or deter marriage” by 
creating these classifications, the courts have deferred to the legisla-
ture.162 
However, it is not clear that the courts’ concerns about the subject 
matter are good reasons to subject marital status to a different and 
more deferential constitutional treatment in these contexts.  Why 
should courts be able to alter constitutional requirements just be-
cause subject matter is conceptually or administratively difficult?163  As 
was made evident by the Hoeper decision, some courts are willing to 
 
157 Kahn, supra note 128, at 888. 
158 Gerzog, supra note 58, at 40. 
159 Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958, 971 (N.D. Ind. 1976).  See also Women In-
volved in Farm Economics v. USDA, 876 F.2d 994, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“In the realm of 
social and economic regulation, in particular, the role of the courts is narrow . . . .”); 
Pilzner, supra note 59, at 1345 (noting that the Mapes court deferred to Congress’s “ex-
pertise” in drafting tax legislation).  Congress has the power to “[t]o lay and collect 
[t]axes” pursuant to Article I of the Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  Govern-
ment benefits are also within Congress’s power to distribute as part of the Spending 
Clause.  Id. 
160 Johnson, 422 F. Supp. at 974. 
161 Women Involved in Farm Economics, 876 F.2d at 1004 (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
162 Johnson, 422 F. Supp. at 972. 
163 Recall that Zablocki held that strict scrutiny was only appropriate when the right to marry 
was substantially burdened.  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 381–82 (1978).  Substan-
tial burdens were not found in the tax and government benefit cases discussed above.  
Yet, it is difficult to see why there was any more of a burden in Bell, where the court struck 
down a rule prohibiting married students from participating in extracurricular or athletic 
activities, than in those cases affecting married couples’ finances.  Bell v. Lone Oak 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 507 S.W.2d 636, 638 (1974). 
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critically wrestle with these issues even under rational basis review ra-
ther than simply defer to Congress’s wisdom.  And, as the court in 
Conklin v. Shinpoch recognized in the context of government benefits, 
“while an economic classification involving finite state funds must be 
treated with deference, the finitude of the fund is not, in itself a suffi-
cient reason for upholding the classification.”164  If it were, “any such 
classification involving a state fund would be valid, since all funds are 
finite.”165 
Additionally, some scholars have posited that the difficulties relied 
upon by the courts are not as severe as the opinions suggest.  For ex-
ample, after detailing the number of disabled adult children (“DAC”) 
receiving benefits compared with the number of disabled beneficiar-
ies,166 Robert Rains argues that “[i]t is difficult to believe that the ad-
ministrative burden posited by the [Jobst] Court would be significant” 
since “the number of disability claims that would be added by allow-
ing a DAC recipient to continue to receive benefits after marriage to 
a disabled person not receiving benefits would be infinitesimal in the 
general Social Security adjudicative system.”167  In addition, Wendy 
Gerzog has argued that one solution to the marriage tax penalty 
would be “to afford married persons filing separately the opportunity 
to utilize the tax rates presently applicable to single individuals.”168  
This, she has claimed, “represents a feasible and easily implemented 
alternative to the marriage penalty.”169  While this solution would ad-
 
164 730 P.2d 643, 649 (Wash. 1986). 
165 Id. (citation omitted). 
166 Rains, supra note 141, at 565 (explaining that “recipients of DAC benefits constitute ap-
proximately 750,000 out of over 12,400,000 disabled beneficiaries”). 
167 Id. at 565–66.  Debra Kahn has made similar arguments concerning the benefits system at 
issue in Women Involved in Farm Economics.  She has argued that while the court accepted 
the government’s assertion that testing for the actual interdependence of a husband and 
a wife “would be too difficult to administer and overly permissive,” it failed to recognize 
and give weight to the fact that the government was willing to examine dependency in the 
case of partnerships, that there was no explanation as to “why it was more difficult to ad-
minister a test of separateness for a married couple than for a partnership,” and that “the 
legislature could easily deal with any problems involving circumvention of the maximum 
payment limitations and any other inequities by increasing the stringency of the edibility 
criteria.”  Kahn, supra note 128, at 890–91.  Kahn contends that “[i]f married couples 
meet the criteria, then they deserve the subsidy payments.  Any subsequent fraud prob-
lems will not be due to the fact that married couples were treated in the same manner as 
others, but will point to the need to apply stricter scrutiny to everyone who cohabitates.”  
Id. at 891. 
168 Gerzog, supra note 58, at 48. 
169 Id.  Amy Christian has also explored potential solutions to the marriage tax penalty prob-
lem, suggesting that this this not a hopeless subject in which we can achieve equality.  See 
generally Amy C. Christian, Legislative Approaches to Marriage Penalty Relief:  The Unintended 
Effects of Change on the Married Couple’s Choice of Filing Status, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 
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mittedly need to be implemented by Congress, its existence suggests 
that the case for equality amongst people of different marital statuses 
in this subject area is not as hopeless as the courts make it seem. 
Second, the difficulties associated with the subject matter do not 
satisfactorily explain why the tax cases in particular were subjected to 
different standards of review amongst themselves.170  Additionally, 
these disparities present problems with the potential argument that, 
unlike in the school activities cases, economic legislation is involved 
here, so only rational basis review should be applied.  If that is true, 
why did the Johnson court seem to apply a higher standard? 
Finally, while this subject area may be one in which Congress has 
broad power to legislate, Antoinette Pilzner has recognized that 
“[c]ongressional concern with” the effects of these penalties “seems 
to disappear once these sections have been codified.”171  Therefore, 
“[t]he courts appear to be the only receptive audience to hear and 
evaluate” these citizens’ “complaints about unequal treatment.”172  To 
dismiss such cases then as outside the courts’ role effectively denies 
citizens any potential relief.  Thus, while the nature of the subject at 
issue may be one explanation of the different treatment of marital 
status in these cases, because courts must wrestle with difficult issues, 
because the difficulties in this area might not be insurmountable, and 
because citizens must have an avenue of redress for constitutional vio-
lations, it is questionable whether this reason is a good one. 
B.  Difficulties in Applying the Right-to-Marry Precendents 
Another reason that courts may seriously struggle with—and chal-
lenges are not successful against—marital status distinctions in the 
tax and government benefits contexts is that the major cases that 
have addressed marriage (Loving, Baird, and Zablocki) are not easily 
applicable to them.  That is, the facts of and language used by the 
major cases present significant challenges for tax and government 
benefits plaintiffs, particularly in terms of the standard of review to be 
applied.  Plaintiffs obviously want the courts to apply the highest 
standard of review possible (since that gives them the best—perhaps 
only—chance to win their cases).  The first obstacle plaintiffs face 
 
303 (1999) (analyzing the text, and the consequences, of marriage penalty relief pro-
posals). 
170 Recall that the Johnson court used language that suggested it was applying a strict scrutiny 
standard, while the Mapes court specifically applied rational basis review.  See supra Part 
II.A. 
171 Pilzner, supra note 59, at 1349. 
172 Id. 
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though is that “[i]n general . . . for purposes of equal protec-
tion . . . married” couples “as a group are not a burdened or suspect 
class,”173 and there have been no strong arguments that “the ‘mar-
riage penalty’ is . . . ‘an attempt to interfere with the individual’s 
freedom to marry.’”174  Therefore, unlike the plaintiffs in Loving, they 
cannot avail themselves of the strict scrutiny standard afforded to 
classifications that invidiously discriminate along suspect lines. 
Thus, they must argue that the laws infringe on their fundamental 
right to marry, which requires them to grapple with Zablocki.  The 
problem though is that Zablocki specifically held “that eve-
ry . . . regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or pre-
requisites for marriage” does not necessarily have to “be subjected to 
rigorous scrutiny.”175  Instead, citing Jobst, the Court held that “rea-
sonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to 
enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.”176  Thus, 
“[t]he key to a clear application of the [Zablocki] test” seems to “lie[] 
in the identification of what constitutes a significant,” substantial, and 
direct “interference with” and individual’s exercise of his or her 
“right to marry.”177  While the Court has offered “relatively little guid-
ance on” this point, from Zablocki we at least know that “classifica-
tion[s] which determine[] who may lawfully enter into the marriage 
relationship” are considered significant, substantial, and direct bur-
dens.178  But, as evidenced by the Zablocki Court’s citation to Jobst, the 
removal of government benefits likely do not. 
As the cases outlined in Subparts II.A and II.B show, courts have 
been unwilling to find significant, substantial, and direct burdens 
when economic marital status classifications are involved.  Specifical-
ly, the Mapes court “refused to apply strict scrutiny to the tax rate 
schedules because they [did] not present a direct obstacle to mar-
riage.”179  Similarly, the Women Involved in Farm Economics court held 
 
173 Id. at 1351–52. 
174 Druker v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 697 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting Califano 
v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 54 (1977)). 
175 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978). 
176 Id. (emphasis added). 
177 Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 11, at 1251. 
178 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 404 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
179 Pilzner, supra note 59, at 1344.  See also Gerzog, supra note 58, at 39 (discussing the Mapes 
court’s finding that “strict scrutiny of the marriage penalty was unnecessary because the 
penalty merely discourages, rather than proscribes, marriage”).  The same result was 
reached in other tax cases as well.  See, e.g., Rinier v. State, 641 A.2d 276, 280 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. 1994) (holding that “the challenged provisions of the New Jersey tax place ‘no direct 
legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get married’” but instead, “[a]t 
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that “the district court was quite correct in concluding that height-
ened scrutiny of the husband-wife rule is inappropriate because the 
rule does not ‘interfere directly and substantially with the right to 
marry,’ . . . nor significantly discourages marriage.”180  Thus, it seems 
that because the tax and government benefit laws do not affirmatively 
prevent people from entering marriage, because, unlike the laws at 
issue in Loving and Zablocki, marriage remains “their choice to 
make,”181 the parties’ arguments for infringement of a fundamental 
right have been struck down. 
However, if this is correct, as plaintiffs have recognized, there is a 
potential problem with the courts’ application of Zablocki.  For, 
Zablocki actually said that “reasonable regulations that do not signifi-
cantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship 
may legitimately be imposed.”182  Thus, taking the Zablocki language 
literally, plaintiffs can argue that these laws significantly interfered 
with their decisions to enter into marriage.  While some courts denied 
that this was the case,183 others recognized it, but still found that the 
fundamental right to marry was not infringed.184  Thus, even though 
scholars have determined that tax code “categorizations drive peo-
ple’s behavior”185 and that marriage penalties in the distribution of 
government benefits “no doubt influence many couples’ decisions to 
 
most . . . impose an indirect burden suffered not from marrying, but ‘from marrying one 
in a particular income group’”). 
180 Women Involved in Farm Econ. v. USDA, 876 F.2d 994, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citations 
omitted). 
181 Rinier, 641 A.2d at 282. 
182 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386 (emphasis added). 
183 See Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 898 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (stating that “we have no data 
showing that as yet [tax effects] operate in [a] manner” by which they impact people’s 
important decisions in life since “[l]ove and marriage defy economic analysis”). 
184 See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 54 (1977) (“That general rule is not rendered invalid 
simply because some persons who might otherwise have married were deterred by the 
rule or because some who did marry were burdened thereby.”); Druker v. Comm’r of In-
ternal Revenue, 697 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that “[w]e do not doubt that the 
‘marriage penalty’ has some adverse effect on marriage,” but rational basis review was still 
appropriate because “[t]he tax rate structure . . . places ‘no direct legal obstacle in the 
path of persons desiring to get married’ . . . [n]or is anyone ‘absolutely prevented’ by it 
from getting married” (citations omitted)); Pilzner, supra note 59, at 1349 (“To date, con-
stitutional challenges to the disparate tax rate schedules as impermissibly burdening the 
fundamental right of marriage have failed to have any enduring effect on the Code.  In 
general, courts have found that, while undeninably burdening married individuals, the 
tax rate schedules do not impose an insurmountable or even significant obstacle to tax-
payers contemplating entering into or continuing a marital relationship.”). 
185 Margaret Ryznar, To Work, or Not to Work?  The Immortal Tax Disincentives for Married Women, 
13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 921, 934 (2009). 
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marry, cohabit, separate, or divorce,”186 and even though “[i]n cases 
involving other fundamental rights . . . the Supreme Court has inter-
preted . . . the concept of a burden . . . broadly,”187 courts have been 
unwilling to find substantial interference because the tax and gov-
ernment benefits laws do not set “prerequisite[s] for the issuance of a 
marriage license.”188 
But, if a substantial obstacle can only be found if the law at issue 
creates an affirmative and explicit barrier to marriage, one may won-
der why the school activities cases, which did not involve regulations 
that required students to “meet[]some condition prior to marriage,” 
still applied strict scrutiny.189  Recall that they held that since “any in-
fringement by” the government “upon a fundamental right of its citi-
zens is subject to the closest judicial scrutiny” and the regulations at 
issue “infringe[d] upon” the students’ “fundamental right to marry,” 
strict scrutiny was appropriate.190  One explanation is that the cases 
cited in this Comment were decided before Zablocki, and so that lan-
guage had not yet been used by the Court.  However, it is interesting 
to note that Johnson, which was also decided before Zablocki, still up-
held the tax law under strict scrutiny even though it affected a fun-
damental right.  The Harvard Law Review Association has suggested 
that the difference could be because the interference in the school 
activities cases is more substantial since, unlike economic changes, it 
“affect[ed] the couple in ways not naturally associated with mar-
 
186 Rains, supra note 141, at 573–74.  See also Gerzog, supra note 58, at 36–37 (“[O]n decisions 
to marry . . . the penalty clearly has been perceived as a disincentive . . . .  Couples may 
still divorce in order to avoid the marriage penalty, although they may continue to live 
together.  They are more likely to remain divorced, however, in order to obtain a contin-
uing tax advantage.  Rather than nullify the effect of tax-motivated divorces, the revenue 
ruling may simply encourage permanent divorce.”); Leslie Whittington, Manipulating 
Marriage?  Federal Income Taxes and the Household Structure Decision, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. 
RTS. 129, 130–31 (1999) (“[W]e find that taxes do influence marriage and divorce deci-
sions.  We find that the marriage tax has a negative impact on marriage probabilities . . . .  
We find that the marriage tax has a positive impact on the probability of divorce . . . .  So 
marriage appears, both in the aggregate and in the microeconomic or household data, to 
in fact be affected by taxes.”). 
187 Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958, 972 (N.D. Ind. 1976).  See also Paul L. Caron, 
Is the Marriage Penalty Unconstitutional?, TAXPROF BLOG (May 12, 2008), 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2008/05/is-the-marriage.html (“[I]t’s hard to 
imagine that a $6000 tax on abortions would not be held to ‘significantly interfere’ with 
what the Supreme Court calls the fundamental constitutional right to an abortion . . . .”). 
188 Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 11, at 1252.  In fact, one court went so far as to argue that 
the “Internal Revenue Code provides an opportunity to the young to demonstrate the 
depth of their unselfishness” by getting married despite the effects of the tax code.  
Mapes, 576 F.2d at 898. 
189 Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 11, at 1255. 
190 Holt v. Shelton, 341 F. Supp. 821, 823 (M.D. Tenn. 1972). 
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riage.”191  That is, “governmental measures affecting a person’s eco-
nomic circumstances seem to represent a less substantial interference 
because changes in economic circumstances typically affect the deci-
sion to marry,” whereas “a change in one’s ability to engage in sports 
is not typically associated with a decision to marry.”192  Relatedly, inso-
far as these cases concern economic rights, it is noteworthy that, at 
least when deciding a case under substantive due process, “the Su-
preme Court has not invalidated a statute . . . where only economic 
rights are implicated since the Lochnerean period.”193 
Thus, because they are not a suspect class and because they can-
not satisfy the substantial interference Zablocki standard, plaintiffs 
have had to fight the tax and government benefits law under rational 
basis review generally applied to economic legislation.  Of course, the 
law in Baird was subjected only to rational basis review and the marital 
status distinction was struck down.194  Therefore, plaintiffs could ar-
gue195 that since “the marital couple is not an independent enti-
ty . . . but an association of two individuals” and “the right of priva-
cy . . . is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion,” they should be treated like all 
other individuals under the tax and government benefit laws.196  In 
fact, this was essentially the winning argument in Hoeper (which, no-
tably, has not been directly overturned:  “[A]ny attempt by a state to 
measure the tax on one person’s property or income by reference to 
the property or income of another is contrary to due process of law as 
 
191 Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 11, at 1254. 
192 Id. 
193 Levinson, supra note 10, at 321.  Though one could rightly question whether only eco-
nomic rights are involved here.  Certainly the plaintiffs would argue that much more is at 
stake. 
194 But see Gerald Gunther, Foreword:  In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:  A 
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32 (1972) (suggesting that more 
than rational basis review was used in Baird). 
195 In fact, particularly when discussing the Women Involved in Farm Economics case, numerous 
scholars have recognized that courts have moved away from treating husband and wife as 
one unit.  See, e.g., Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatiza-
tion of Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 415, 427 (2005) (“[In the 1970s] 
[m]arriage came increasingly to be viewed as a private relationship intended to promote 
individual happiness, which in turn supported an approach to legal regulation that em-
phasized privacy and decisional autonomy: individuals should decide for themselves when 
and how to enter into and exit from relationships.” (emphasis added)); Kahn, supra note 
128, at 886, 887 (“Many courts, however, have rejected the notion that a husband and 
wife should be treated as one person . . . . The abolition of the interspousal tort immunity 
doctrine epitomizes society’s recognition that husband and wife are separate individuals 
whose individual rights are not forfeited upon marriage.”). 
196 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
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guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”197  In other words, each 
person, whether married or single, has the right to be treated like 
other individuals.  However, Baird also recognized that classifications 
could be made so long as “all persons similarly circumstanced shall be 
treated alike.”198  As Jobst makes clear, due to presumptions about de-
pendency,199 courts have been unwilling to find that for purposes of 
economic legislation, the married and unmarried are similarly situat-
ed.200  Therefore, the laws have survived review. 
But a number of scholars have argued that these analyses were 
wrong and have instead provided alternatives that do not require 
wrestling with the more problematic language in Loving, Baird, or 
Zablocki.  For example, Martha Fineman has posited that marriage, 
since it no longer “serves the essential function of managing depend-
ency,” should be abolished “as a legal category.”201  Clearly, this would 
eliminate all marital-status based discrimination.  Put another way, 
married and unmarried individuals could be treated identically, no 
matter what.  However, this is a fairly radical solution given the num-
ber of marital-status based distinctions in our current legal system 
and is therefore unlikely to be adopted. 
Debra Khan provides a more realistic approach.  In discussing 
Women Involved in Farm Economics, she argued that 
[b]ecause the husband-wife rule involved both government benefits and 
an overtly discriminatory classification, the court should have applied a 
‘heightened standard’ and considered factors such as the character of 
the classification, the importance of the benefits provided, the validity of 
the presumption of marital interdependence, and the asserted state in-
terests supporting the classification.  This approach would have enabled 
the court to balance the costs of promulgating the husband-wife rule 
against the government’s claims of administrative convenience and ne-
cessity to avoid excessive subsidy payments.202 
Similarly, Antoinette Pilzner has argued in the tax context that mar-
ried taxpayers could be deemed “a quasi-suspect class” because “like 
gender, an individual’s marital status bears no relation to the individ-
uals’ proportionate liability for fiscal support of the government 
 
197 Hoeper v. Tax Comm’n of Wisconsin, 284 U.S. 206, 213 (1931). 
198 Id. at 447 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
199 The courts’ presumptions about marital dependency will be discussed in Subpart IV.C. 
200 But see Hoeper, 284 U.S. at 217 (“[T]he state has, except in its purely social aspects, taken 
from the marriage status all the elements which differentiate it from that of the single 
person.  In property, business and economic relations they are the same.”). 
201 Fineman, supra note 2, at 261, 267. 
202 Kahn, supra note 128, at 889. 
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through the payment of income taxes.”203  If married taxpayers are 
deemed a quasi-suspect class, Pilzner suggests that Congress’s 
stated goals of equity, economic efficiency and minimal complexi-
ty . . . might not be held to be substantially related to the important gov-
ernmental interest of revenue collection under a heightened scrutiny 
analysis.  These individual Code sections could then be excised from the 
statute or revised to correct the unequal treatment.204 
Unlike eliminating marital-status distinctions, changing the level of 
scrutiny applied in these cases would be simple for courts to imple-
ment, would result in fairer outcomes, and would permit the courts 
to adhere more closely with the rationales in Loving, Baird, and 
Zablocki. 
C.  Assumed Privatization of Dependency 
A third, and perhaps the most important, reason that challenges 
to tax and government benefit marital status discriminations have 
failed is either explicitly or implicitly addressed in most of these cases:  
The courts unquestionably accept Congress’s assumption that mar-
ried persons have greater financial resources and independence from 
the government or others than their unmarried counterparts and 
therefore (in the case of taxes) can afford to pay more and (in the 
case of government benefits) can afford to receive less.205  However, 
 
203 Pilzner, supra note 59, at 1354, 1354 at n.87. 
204 Id. at 1354.  Pilzner also contends that “[c]urrent societal trends,” such as “the pervasive 
presence of two-earner married couples . . . may require Congress to reassess its rationale 
for treating married taxpayers as differently as the Code has since 1948.”  Id., at 1352.  
Margaret Ryznar has also suggested that intermediate scrutiny might be appropriate for 
tax legislation since the current tax law, by most severely penalizing those couples who 
earn equal amounts of money, creates disincentives for women to enter the workforce 
and therefore discriminates on the basis of gender. Ryznar, supra note 185, at 941–42.  
However, such an argument raises a host of other questions that are not the subject of 
this Comment. 
205 See, e.g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53 (1977) (“Both tradition and common experi-
ence support the conclusion that marriage is an event which normally marks an im-
portant change in economic status . . . [so] there can be no question about the validity of 
the assumption that a married person is less likely to be dependent on his parents for 
support than one who is unmarried.”); Cherry v. Sullivan, 30 F.3d 73, 75 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(“Indiana has the additional legitimate interest in recognizing the marital relationship for 
what it is, a relationship of interdependence wherein it is neither unfair nor unrealistic to 
require one spouse to support the other . . . .”); Women Involved in Farm Econ. v. USDA, 
876 F.2d 994, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Congress . . . has reasonably determined that mar-
ried couples, as a group, are more likely than other ‘partners’ in farming enterprises to 
share completely in the products of their efforts—in other words, to be economically in-
terdependent—and the Constitution requires no more precision than this in the circum-
stances we confront.”).  Scholars have also recognized the relationship between marriage 
and financial dependency.  See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 2, at 242–43 (“[M]arriage 
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there are two serious flaws with this assumption and courts’ reliance 
on it:  (1) scholars have shown that it is largely invalid and outdated; 
and (2) it is underinclusive in that cohabitating couples often have 
the same financial independence as married couples, yet the former 
are often not subject to the same financial penalties. 
First, many scholars have shown that we “can . . . question . . . the 
validity of the assumption that a married person is less likely to be 
dependent” on others “for support than one who is unmarried.”206  
This is partly because marriage “no longer serves individual and soci-
etal dependency needs in the way that it once did.”207  For example, 
Fineman argues that it is a myth to “assume[] that the marital family 
serves the essential function of managing dependency” because, due 
to high rates of divorce and other causes, “the family imagined in this 
discourse and policy no longer exists.”208  Similarly, Gerzog concludes 
that “while economies of scale and available funds for discretionary 
uses are proffered as justifications for the existence of the marriage 
penalty [in the tax code], they are not compelling” because they do 
 
can . . . be seen as serving society by taking care of the dependency and vulnerability of 
some members of the marital family.”); Gerzog, supra note 58, at 34–35 (“The marital sta-
tus of an individual reflects his ability to pay in several ways.  First economies of scale are 
produced by the marriage of two individuals who previously maintained separate house-
holds; necessary living expenses are thereby reduced. . . . Incidental expenses are lower as 
well . . . . Because of the savings inherent in most marriages, it may logically be argued 
that a married couple should, in fact, pay more taxes than two single persons with indi-
vidual incomes one-half that of the couple, and that the marriage penalty serves to equal-
ize the respective abilities to pay.”); Scott, supra note 7, at 236, 240–41, 243 (observing 
that marriage is a “union . . . of economic sharing,” that it “is likely to function more reli-
ably as a family form that provides . . . financial and emotional understandings about mu-
tual responsibility, support, and sharing,” that “the duty to share a portion of each 
spouse’s estate  automatically attach[es] upon marriage,” and that “[t]he marital 
vows . . . represent explicit and implicit promises by each spouse to accept a set of respon-
sibilities that will assure that the other’s dependency needs are met.”); Lawrence Zelenak, 
Doing Something About Marriage Penalties:  A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 9 
(2000) (“[T]he heavier tax [on married couples] was appropriate [according to the Gen-
eral Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969] because a married ‘couple’s living ex-
penses are likely to be less than those of two single persons and therefore the couple’s tax 
should be higher than that of two single persons.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
206 Jobst, 434 U.S. at 53. 
207 Scott, supra note 7, at 235.  See also Fineman, supra note 2, at 245 (“Marriage does not 
have the same relevance as a societal institution as it did even fifty years ago, when it was 
the primary means of protecting and providing for the legal and structurally devised de-
pendency of wives.”). 
208 Fineman, supra note 2, at 267.  See also Enjoli Francis, Marriage Rate Falls to Record Low in 
U.S., Pew Says, ABC NEWS  (Dec. 14, 2011, 2:02 PM) (quoting W. Bradford Wilcox, direc-
tor of the National Marriage Project at the University of Virginia, as saying that 
“[m]arriage is less likely to anchor the adult life course,” and “plays a less central role as 
an institution in American life.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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not reflect true dependency.209  Finally, in the context of Women In-
volved in Farm Economics, Debra Kahn contends that the court not only 
“based its analysis on an invalid presumption that married farmers 
are always economically interdependent,” it also “assumed that be-
cause unique economies of scale exist with respect to consumption, it 
was rational to assume such efficiencies exist with respect to the input 
and production considerations inherent in farming.”210  However, 
since “[t]he Agricultural Act’s farm subsidy program is concerned 
with production, not consumption” the presumption was irrelevant.211  
These arguments at least suggest that while marital status may once 
have been indicative of financial need, it may no longer be a rational 
basis upon which to uphold the marriage penalties. 
Second, the courts’ acceptance of the assumption that marital sta-
tus reflects a person’s financial need and ability to pay is grossly 
underinclusive given the fact that two single individuals can cohabi-
tate and share finances (as is happening at an exponential rate to-
day),212 yet avoid the marriage penalties.  As Lawrence Zelenak has 
argued, “[t]he argument” for the marriage penalties “depends on the 
assumption that the proper comparison to the married couple living 
together is to their unmarried selves living apart.”213  But 
[t]he entire analysis crumbles if the relevant comparison is to unmarried 
cohabitation.  A marriage license does not make living any cheaper for 
those already living together.  When cohabitation is a viable alternative—
as it may not have been in 1969, but as it is for millions today—the appeal 
to economies of sharing completely misses the point of the marriage 
penalty complaint.  When the standard formulation of the complaint is a 
comparison with the tax on cohabitants, it is ludicrous to defend the 
marriage penalty by citing economies of cohabitation.214 
When the comparison is made between married and cohabitating 
partners, it is difficult to argue that they are not similarly situated, 
thus presenting an equal protection problem.  Furthermore, it is 
noteworthy that the reverse could be true as well.  That is, a married 
 
209 Gerzog, supra note 58, at 36. 
210 Kahn, supra note 128, at 881, 889. 
211 Id. at 889. 
212 See Rob Stein, Study:  Record Number of People are Cohabitating, NPR (April 4, 2013, 2:32 
AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/04/04/176203263/study-record-number-of-people-are-
cohabitating (noting that today’s rate of cohabitation is the highest to date). 
213 Zelenak, supra note 205, at 10. 
214 Id. at 10–11. 
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couple could live apart and maintain separate households and fi-
nances and yet still be subject to the marriage penalties.215 
One response to this criticism is that “marriage is superior as a set-
ting for satisfying family dependency needs,” whereas “[i]nformal un-
ions,” such as cohabitation “function far less effectively to assure that 
the dependency needs of vulnerable family members will be met.”216  
However, rather than ignoring the gross underinclusiveness of the 
marriage penalty, it would be wiser for courts to recognize that, inso-
far as they are justified on the basis of financial dependency, mar-
riage penalties are largely irrational.  Another solution is provided by 
Elizabeth Scott, who argues that rather than eliminating the marriage 
penalties, “the financial obligations of marriage should be extended 
to long-term cohabitants in order to provide protection for financial-
ly vulnerable partners.”217  The Supplemental Security Income pro-
gram currently adopts a similar approach.  That is, if a person lives 
with one or more other people and receives “in-kind support,” de-
fined as the provision by someone else of the recipient’s food and/or 
shelter, the amount of the recipient’s benefits is reduced by one-
third.218  Thus, long-term cohabitants and married couples could both 
experience a reduction in benefits.219 
But regardless of the solution chosen, the bottom line is that the 
marriage penalties simply should not be able to survive even rational 
basis review based on the invalid, underinclusive, and irrational pre-
sumption of financial independence of married couples. 
 
215 See Gerzog, supra note 58, at 35 (noting a criticism of the marriage tax penalty that argues 
“that the ability to pay of married persons who live apart can be equated with that of sin-
gle persons who maintain their own households”). 
216 Scott, supra note 7, at 245, 248. 
217 Id. at 233.  In fact, some legislatures have already created such laws that deem people 
married for purposes of government benefit distribution when they have cohabitated for 
a certain period of time.  Furthermore, courts have upheld such laws as rational.  See, e.g., 
Smith v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 235, 240 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that Congress acted rationally 
when it “elected to use the ‘deemed married’ provision as a signpost of financial need 
and to eliminate fraud and ease administrative burdens”). 
218 Alison Barjaktarovich, How In-Kind Income and Support Affects Your SSI Disability Payment, 
DISABILITY SECRETS, http://www.disabilitysecrets.com/resources/supplemental-security-
income-ssi/in-kind-income-support-disability-payment (explaining what counts as in-kind 
income and how that income reduces SSI benefits).  See also Laurence, supra note 101 
(cautioning same-sex partners that “if you are receiving SSI and you and your [significant 
other] begin living together, Social Security could lower your monthly SSI payment by 
one third if your [significant other] beings [sic] to pay for part of your share of your food 
or housing costs”). 
219 See Laurence, supra note 101 and Barjaktarovich, supra note 218 for an explanation of 
the circumstances that can cause reduction in SSI benefits for married and cohabitating 
couples. 
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D.  The Existence of Other Benefits and the Limited Applications of the 
Penalties 
A final, albeit never stated, reason that courts may be unwilling to 
find violations in the marriage penalties of the tax and government 
benefit laws is that married couples receive many other benefits as a 
result of being married.220  For example, married couples enjoy spe-
cial treatment in the areas of “military and government pensions, 
family leave, health and life insurance, . . . inheritance rights[,] and 
guardianship designations.”221  Thus, it is likely difficult for courts to 
see them as “victims of improper state [or government] action” when 
the burden placed on them is “only” economic.222 
Furthermore, under both the tax and government benefit laws, 
not all, and potentially even a small number of, married couples are 
burdened.223  In fact, some married couples are benefited by the stat-
utes at issue.  For example, “[t]here is a marriage bonus in the . . . tax 
code as well” that applies to those couples comprised of one wage 
earner.224  Or, if the law does not benefit some married couples, it 
may allow for ways around the marriage penalty.  For example, the 
Women Involved in Farm Economics court observed that “if a husband 
and wife formed a corporation to operate their farm—and met the 
corporation eligibility standards—they could qualify for two maxi-
mum payments,” even though they were precluded from qualifying as 
separate individuals.225 
Of course, “[t]he couples subject to the marriage tax” or unable 
to get around the penalty at issue “are not consoled by the fact that 
other couples enjoy tax marriage bonuses” or loopholes in the law, 
and it is unclear why the existence of benefits to others makes this 
discrimination constitutional.226  In addition, it is worth remembering 
that courts have consistently stated that it is sound public policy to 
 
220 See Scott, supra note 7, at 237 (“Legal marriage is a status that carries many government 
benefits.”). 
221 Id. at 253. 
222 Lundin, supra note 18, at 1192. 
223 See Gerzog, supra note 58, at 31 (“The first [reason for retaining the marriage penalty] 
 . . . is that the penalty affects only a minority of married couples.”). 
224 Ryznar, supra note 185, at 928.  See also Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 902 (Ct. Cl. 
1978) (“It is evident that many benefit by the [tax] rates created in the statute.”); Gerzog, 
supra note 58, at 27 (observing that sometimes marriage “results in a tax savings”); 
Pilzner, supra note 59, at 1353 (“[S]ome married taxpayers realize a tax liability decrease 
by filing a joint return.”) 
225 Women Involved in Farm Econ. v. USDA, 876 F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
226 Zelenak, supra note 205, at 1. 
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encourage marriage.227  Therefore, it is not evident why the existence 
of marital benefits in some contexts would preclude others that 
might also encourage marriage.  Finally, one should also question 
why an entire class might need to be burdened in order for a consti-
tutional violation to be found.  Regardless of the number of people 
affected, sound constitutional analysis would seem to require that 
laws irrationally and arbitrarily distinguishing amongst people should 
be struck down.  Thus, to the extent these considerations factor into 
courts’ decisions in upholding marriage penalties, they are inappro-
priate. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether because of the subject matter, the tenuous connection to 
the leading right-to-marry precedents, the acceptance of assumed 
privatization of dependency within marriage, the host of other bene-
fits afforded to married couples, or a combination of these factors, 
courts have made it clear that they are going to continue to uphold 
marriage penalties in tax and government benefit laws against due 
process and equal protection challenges.  Nevertheless, this has not 
stopped plaintiffs from challenging the penalties, and politicians and 
lawmakers continue to try to find more equitable solutions.228  For ex-
ample, in 2010 President Barack Obama signed the Tax Relief, Un-
employment Insurance Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 
2010, which, among other things, “extended marriage penalty relief 
for married couples filing jointly.”229  And before the 2012 presiden-
tial election, he proposed to continue that relief.230  In addition, as 
previously mentioned, Supplemental Security Income now adjusts the 
value of benefits paid when a maritally single person lives with anoth-
er person and does not provide for his or her own food and shelter.231 
Of course, this does not mean that these same politicians and 
lawmakers are completely abolishing marriage penalties.  In fact, 
while he seemed to support marriage penalty relief in the tax context, 
 
227 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
228 See Ryznar, supra note 185, at 923 (observing that “both Democrats and Republicans sup-
port marriage penalty relief, although the details of an exact solution have been elusive”). 
229 Candidates Individual Tax Policies, FOREMAN & AIRHART, http://www.foremanairhart.com/
candidates-tax-policies/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2014) (“In late 2010, Congress passed and 
President Obama signed the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization and 
Job Creation Act of 2010 . . . which extended through 2012 the Bush-era tax cuts.”). 
230 See id. (“Obama has proposed to extend the Bush-era tax cuts, including marriage penalty 
relief, for individuals, with the exception of a rate increase for single taxpayers with in-
comes at or above $200,000 and joint filers with incomes of $250,000 or more.”). 
231 See supra notes 218–219 and accompanying text. 
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President Barack Obama also signed the Affordable Care Act which 
creates “higher health insurance costs for couples who marry.”232  This 
is because the Act requires married couples to file joint tax returns, 
and their healthcare premiums are then based on their combined to-
tal income.233  This requirement does not apply to cohabitating cou-
ples, and therefore they avoid the penalty.234  While it is difficult to 
see how such a requirement could survive the Johnson court’s basis for 
distinguishing Hoeper,235 given the most recent jurisprudence, it is un-
likely that this penalty will be struck down as unconstitutional marital 
status discrimination under either the Due Process or Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 
Therefore, it seems apparent that these marriage penalties are not 
going away.  Yet, if they are going to stay, it would be wise for the 
courts to require and find clearer, stronger, more rational, and up-to-
date grounds upon which to uphold them. 
 
232 Michael Tennant, ObamaCare’s Marriage Penalty, THE NEW AMERICAN (Aug. 19, 2013, 3:21 
PM), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/health-care/item/16352-obamacare-s-
marriage-penalty. 
233 Id. 
234 Id.  In fact, according to one hypothetical example, not only do cohabitating couples 
avoid the penalty, they save a significant amount of money.  In this example, wherein the 
woman earned about $46,000 per year and the man earned $56,000 per year, the couple 
saved $8,000 per year just in healthcare premiums by not getting married and simply co-
habitating.  Id.  According to another example, “[s]ixty year-olds earning $62,041 each a 
year would save $11,028 annually” in healthcare costs “if they broke up.”  Jacqueline Leo, 
Why Divorce Attorneys Will Love Obamacare, THE FISCAL TIMES (Oct. 2, 2013), 
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/10/02/Why-Divorce-Attorneys-Will-Love-
Obamacare. 
235 Recall that the Johnson court distinguished the law at issue in its case from Hoeper’s on the 
grounds that the Hoeper law did not give married couples a choice about whether to file 
joint or separate returns.  See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
